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Abstract
The experiment disentangles communication and social effect in face−to−face
communication. The results question the previous interpretation of communication effects in
ultimatum bargaining, and suggest that separate processes, both of a strategic and of an
affective−social nature induce cooperative outcomes.
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Typically experimental economists evaluate economic situations in anonymous 
experiments. Subjects interact via the computer, where they type in their decisions, and 
are matched anonymously. Much effort is done in keeping subjects separate and to avoid 
subject communication. This might be due to the fact that pre-play face-to-face 
communication is known to influence strategic choice. 
In an experiment, described by Roth (1995), face-to-face communication proved to 
induce lower disagreement rates and higher equal-split rates when compared to no 
communication in ultimatum bargaining. The present experiment was conducted in order 
to distinguish between two possible hypotheses regarding the effects of face-to-face 
communication, which Roth (1995) refers to as the uncontrolled social utility hypothesis, 
and the communication hypothesis. 
The uncontrolled social utility hypothesis suggests that in the social environment 
created by face-to-face communication, preferences become hard to control. For 
example, people will probably be less likely to take advantage of other people who are 
similar to themselves, or who are part of their in-group (cf. Dawes, 1990). 
The communication hypothesis, on the other hand, emphasizes the nonverbal channels 
available in face-to-face communication. Thus, face-to-face communication is not 
qualitatively different from written communication, but more efficient as it uses multiple 
channels, which are usually more reliable than the written or verbal channels alone. 
Roth’s results show a significant decrease in ultimatum rejections (33% in the control 
treatment, 4% and 6% in the unrestricted and restricted communication treatments, 
respectively) and increase in mean offers ($4.27 out of $10 in the control treatment, $4.85 
and $4.70 in the unrestricted and restricted communication treatments, respectively). The 
increase in mean offers corresponds to the higher rates of equal split offers in the 
unrestricted communication treatment, (75% compared to 31% in the control treatment 
and 39% in the restricted communication treatment). When offers around the equal split 
($4.50-$5.50) are examined, high rates are observed in both communication treatments 
(83% and 82% in the unrestricted and restricted communication treatments respectively, 
50% in the control treatment). Based on these findings, Roth (1995) rejected the 
communication hypothesis, claiming that his restricted communication treatment 
precludes strategic communication. 
Note, however, that the support for this claim is not unequivocal, since the results do 
not rule out strategic effects. It is important to note that the disagreement rates do not 
capture the responder’s behavior, as responders in different treatments are acting on the 
basis of different offers. Once the proposers play in a cooperative way, making relatively 
high offers, disagreement rates drop regardless of the responder’s implicit acceptance 
threshold. In the current experiment behavior is studied using the strategy method, thus 
enabling an unconfounded test of the assumption about responders’ communication-
induced cooperativeness. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
In the current experiment subjects participate in an ultimatum game (Güth et. al, 1981) 
in either play or strategy method. The three treatments described by Roth (1995, p.278) – 
no communication, restricted, and unrestricted communication - are replicated using 3 
video conferencing. In the restricted communication treatments, subjects do not know the 
game they are about to play when they engage in pre-play face-to-face communication in 
the first round.  
The sessions took place in the video laboratory of the Max Planck Institute in Jena,  
Germany in June 2002 for play method and in November 2003 for strategy method. To 
prevent the influence of possible gender specific communication effects female students 
of Jena University were recruited, which was done randomly via email using an online 
recruitment system (Greiner 2004). Participants were bachelor-level and master-level 
students from different field of studies, with less than 15% of them studying Business and 
Economics. Altogether 48 subjects participated in 6 sessions which lasted about 90 
minutes each. A pie of 9 € has been used in the experiment. For pay-off one round was 
randomly determined. Average total pay-offs were 8.08 € for proposers and 7.42 € for 
responders including a 4 € show-up fee.  
Proposers and Responders arrived separately and were each led to a sound proof 
cabin. Participants were given written instructions, which were (announced to be) the 
same for both proposer and responder roles. In the unrestricted communication treatment 
the game specific instructions were provided before the communication stage. In the 
restricted communication treatment the participants only knew that they would play a 2-
players game at this stage, and received the full instructions following the first 
communication stage.  
In each round the play stage followed a two minutes communication stage. During the 
communication stage each participant could see herself and the other player onscreen. In 
the baseline treatment subjects merely waited for two minutes and could not see their 
partner. 
The play stage started with the proposers indicating their offer, which was restricted to 
a vector of x2 = {0.5,1.0,….,8.0,8.5}. Responders in the play method sessions were then 
asked to respond to the proposal. Responders in the strategy method sessions were asked 
for a response for each of the 17 possible offers, which were presented in a random order. 
Then, a strategy method responder was presented with an overview and was allowed to 
change specific decisions. The decisions forms were computerized using zTree 
(Fischbacher 1999). 
Four rounds, each including a communication stage and a play stage, were played, so 
that each proposer played with each responder in a stranger matching design. No 
feedback was given between rounds. Subjects participating in communication treatments 
were shown a still picture of all four participants they had played with, and were asked to 
rate each one using the semantic differential (Osgood et al., 1957). Finally, decisions and 
results of each round were provided. One round was randomly chosen for the actual 
payoff. The participants were paid out in cash and left the laboratory. Proposers left 




Although offers in the control treatment were lower than those observed by Roth 
(1995, p. 297), the effects observed there for proposers’ data are qualitatively replicated: 
Generally, communication induce lower disagreement frequencies, following higher 
offers and a higher rate of near-equal offers (see Table 1 for comparisons to the baseline). 
Average offers do not differ between unrestricted and restricted communication, though 
significantly more equal split offers were observed in the unrestricted than in the  4 













































0.345  0.134  32 0.22  0.34  0.125  0.367 
 




***  0.077  32 0.75
xxx  0.78
 xxx  0.063  0.467




***  0.073  32 0.37  0.81
 xxx  0.029  0.244
***  0.12  16 
 
a Proposer data of play and strategy method sessions have been combined. In the experiment the 
decision environment for proposers in both methods was equal beside the knowledge of the responder 
decision method. 
*** Higher than baseline, p<0.01, Mann-Whitney test, one-sided. 
+++ Lower than baseline, p<0.01, Mann-Whitney test, one-sided. 
xxx Higher than baseline, p<0.01, χ
2 test, one-sided. 
 
restricted communication treatment (χ
2=9.143, p<0.01, one-sided). Recall that Roth 
(1995) interpreted these results as supporting the uncontrolled social utility hypothesis.  
Nevertheless, when we turn to the data obtained using the strategy method, which 
enables us to examine responders’ strategy vector, a different pattern emerges. Even 
though the offers are qualitatively similar to the offers obtained by Roth (1995, p.297), an 
evaluation of the acceptance thresholds
1 provides evidence for less cooperative 
responders in the unrestricted communication treatment who reject significantly higher 
offers compared to the baseline (Table 1). In contrast, acceptance thresholds in the 
restricted communication treatment are significantly lower than the baseline. This pattern 
suggests that the high offers in the two communication treatments are generated by 
different processes.  
When subjects discuss the game, responders make ultimatums of their own, thus equal 
split offers are driven by a strategic effect. The following translated quote from an 
unrestricted bilateral session underlines this point: 
Responder:  Well, make a good offer. 
Proposer:  You are really so two fisted? You really say 45 and everything else will 
be refused? 
Responder:  Yes, of course. Why not?  
Proposer:  Because you run the risk of getting nothing. 
Responder:  But so do you. And I don’t see why I should give anyone a donation. 
Why should I? 
                                           
1 Out of  48 strategy vectors obtained over the three treatments, 46 were monotonic (i. e. if an offer x2 was 
accepted, then all offers y>x2 were also accepted). In one case, the lowest and highest offers were rejected 
(for a discussion of non-monotonic strategy vectors see Güth et al., 2003), and in one case a single high 
offer was rejected (probably due to a typing error made by the subject in the first round). As all offer 
vectors were monotonic between the equal split and the minimum offer, we reduce the vector to the 
acceptance threshold, defined as the lowest offer accepted. 5 
Conversely, when subjects are prohibited from discussing the game, the higher offers 
(but not necessarily equal splits) are driven by social effects. This dichotomy was not 
evident in the play-method data, as the high offers in both treatments had caused low 
conflict rates, regardless of responders' strategies. 
A factor analysis of the subjects' ratings revealed a single, general impression, 
variable. This variable was significantly correlated with actual decisions (i.e. a more 
positive rating of a responder tends to follow a high offer) only when communication was 
unrestricted (Kendall's τ=0.661, p<0.01), possibly because the strategic bargaining 





The results question the previous interpretation of communication effects in ultimatum 
bargaining. The experiment reported by Roth (1995), applying play method, was not able 
to uncover responders’ strategies, as the observed disagreements rate was driven 
primarily by proposers’ offers. Comparison between treatments was meaningless in this 
respect, as the responders in separate treatments were faced with different decision tasks. 
In the current study, however, the use of the strategy method made it possible compare 
responders' strategies in different treatments. Thus, the similar disagreements rate 
obtained by Roth (1995) for unrestricted and restricted pre-play communication is now 
shown to result from different processes.  
Although the effects of restricted social communication may derive from 
considerations of social utility, which increases cooperative behavior, in the case of 
unrestricted communication, when the players can discuss the game, the low 
disagreement frequency does not stem from increased cooperation, as the responders are 
in fact acting in a less cooperative manner. Rather, the result derives from strategic 
coordination on the egalitarian outcome, as evidenced in the significant difference 
between the likelihood of an exact equal split offer with unrestricted and restricted 
communication. 
To conclude, the results of the reported experiment suggest that pre-play 
communication effects may be the outcome of both strategic and social-affective 
processes, depending on the protocol of the communication. Game-relevant 
communication affects the strategic considerations of the players, whereas social 
communication may induce cooperative behavior through affective processes. The 
influence of the protocol may come about by means of inducing different frames for the 
interaction. When players are making a decision following a bargaining discussion, they 
become more sensitive to the strategic considerations, and conversely, when the decision 
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A1. General Instructions 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. Instructions are identical for every 
participant. The experiment consists of 4 rounds. You are able to earn money during the 
experiment. The amount you earn depends on your own decisions and the decisions of 
other participants of the experiment. In addition, for showing up on time you are paid 4 €. 
Amounts will be displayed in ECU (Experimental currency unit) during the experiment. 
10 ECU are converted in 1 €. 
There are 8 subjects participating in the experiment. The four participants in cabins 5 – 
8 decide as type X. The four participants in cabins 1 – 4 decide as Y. The number of your 
cabin is printed at the door. In each round a participant of type X interacts with a 
participant of type Y. During the following 4 rounds you interact with no other 
participant twice. 
At the end of the experiment one round will be determined randomly for payoffs. Your 
particular payoff in ECU during this round will be converted to Euro and paid out 
together with the 4 € show-up fee in cash after the experiment. Participants of type X and 
Y will be paid out separately and will leave the building separately. Since X and Y 
participants were also invited at different date, participants of different types will not 
meet each other at any point in time. There are female participants only. 
Baseline – no communication 
You participate in an experiment without video- and audio communication, which 
means that neither you will be able to see your partner at any point during the 
experiment, nor your partner will be able to see you. The audio and video components are 
deactivated.  
You will receive a separate sheet that describes the exact course of events during each 
round.  
Restricted communication treatment 
At the beginning of each round you can communicate with the assigned participant of 
the other type via video conference for 2 minutes. 7 
Both participants are able to see and hear their assigned partners. You are not allowed 
to talk about the content of the experiment. This will be controlled by us. Any attempt to 
break this rule will result in exclusion from payments. 
After the initial 2 minutes of communication are over, you will be handed a separate 
sheet that describes the content of the game. 
Unrestricted communication treatment 
At the beginning of each round you can communicate with the assigned participant of 
the other type via video conference for 2 minutes. 
Both participants are able to see and hear their assigned partners and you are free to 
decide what you talk about. 
 
A2. Game Instructions 
 
After the communication phase the communication via audio and video will be 
interrupted and the X/Y pairs interact via the computer according to the following rules: 
In each round X proposes how to split the available pie of 90 ECU between Y and 
himself. Therefore X marks down the amount reserved for Y on the screen (that means 
the rest of the pie is reserved for X). 
Instructions for play method 
This proposal will be announced to Y,  who is able to accept or reject this proposal. In 
case Y accepts, X and Y receive the distribution specified by X. In case Y rejects, both 
participants receive nothing.  
Instructions for strategy method 
This proposal will not be announced to Y. Y will mark for all feasible proposals, that 
is X=85 and Y=5, …, X=5 and Y=85, whether to accept or reject. The possible 
distributions will be presented in random order. At the end there is the option to change 
entries on an overview screen.  
The payoff will be determined the following way: the proposal of X will be compared 
to the corresponding decision of Y. In case Y accepted, X and Y receive the distribution 
specified by X. In case Y rejects both participants receive nothing. This means each 
decision of Y may determine the payoff. 
 
Control questionnaire 
 The following three questions test whether you understand the described rules of the 
game. Please try to answer the questions the best you can. Before starting the experiment 
we will check whether you answered the questions correctly. 
Imagine a type X participant made a proposal of 15 ECU to Y and Y accepts this 
proposal: What is the amount X and Y receive:         
  X receives ________ECU    Y receives __________ ECU 
Imagine a type X participant made a proposal of 70 ECU to Y and Y rejects this 
proposal : What is the amount X and Y receive:         
  X receives ________ECU    Y receives __________ ECU 
Imagine a type X participant made a proposal of 5 ECU to Y and Y accepts this 
proposal : What is the amount X and Y receive:         
  Y receives ________ECU    X receives __________ ECU 
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A3. Instructions Questionnaire 
 
Please mark on the questionnaire the number of the cabin of the subject you are rating.  
To evaluate your impressions of the different subjects on the video screen we would like 
to ask you to rate the subjects according to the following scales. We will display on the 
monitor all four subjects you were interacting with at once. Please fill out the 
questionnaire for each person separately. Please mark according to the number displayed 
on the door (behind the subjects) which person you are currently evaluating, and fill in all 
of the scales. 
Following are the instructions on how to use the scales. In case you are not sure how 
to fill out the questionnaire you can have a look at this instruction again. 
In case you find a person to rate very similar to an attribute at the end of the scale, 
then check one of the following boxes 
active   x o o o o o o passive 
active   o o o o o o x passive 
In case you find a person to rate quite similar to an attribute at the end of the scale, 
then check one of the following boxes 
active   o x o o o o o passive 
active   o o o o o x o passive 
In case you find a person to rate slightly similar to an attribute at the end of the scale, 
then check one of the following boxes 
active   o o x o o o o passive 
active   o o o o x o o passive 
Naturally, the horizontal direction of your cross depends on which of the two 
attributes on the scale describes the person you are rating best. 
When the person you are rating can be described as neutral with regard to the two 
attributes, that is, both attributes apply to the person to the same extent, you should check 
the box in the middle.  
active   o o o x o o o passive 
Please mark down whether you knew the person you are rating before. Please mark 
whether you have just seen the person (e.g. at university) but do not know her personally, 
or whether you know your partner personally. 
 
A4. Computerized Questionnaire 
 
For every partner the following scales had to be rated by the receiver of 
communication: 
 
active   o o o o o o o passive 
welcome    o o o o o o o displeasing 
agile    o o o o o o o calm 
beautiful    o o o o o o o ugly 
strong    o o o o o o o weak 
influential    o o o o o o o non  influential 
 
 
 